How does Social Inclusion/Exclusion Elicit Radical Support Online?
By Anastasia Kordoni, Paul J Taylor, Stacey M Conchie and Kathleen C McCulloch (Lancaster University)
“Sudden lockdown left us stranded.” Around the world, the pandemic has layered social exclusion and social inequality onto existing health and economic divides. People are excluded from common benefits. Social distancing and restrictions of day-to-day activities affect most aspects of their social life. Such responses are seized on by radical ideologies to validate their political views and gain support, using the Internet as their primary communication channel. In times of crisis, do people respond to social exclusion with radical endorsements? Does social inclusion deter these endorsements? We show that this depends on the characteristics of the radical messages people are exposed to, and the meaning of social inclusion/exclusion in the political context it applies.
Political radicalization is when a person comes to identify with a radical group who reject the status quo and provide a means for social change. This occurs when an individual rejects the status quo because they have perceived or experienced a social injustice (Bal & van den Bos, 2017). Joining a radical group allows the person to address the injustice as it provides them with a way to restore their self-worth and satisfy their basic need to belong (Bäck, Bäck, Altermark, & Knapton, 2018). In this sense, social exclusion as a practice of experienced injustice can predispose a person to radicalization. Individuals who undertook lone acts of terrorism in the US and Europe had experienced social exclusion and exposure to a radical group’s advocacy before adopting its ideology (Gill, Horgan, & Deckert, 2014). However, social inclusion may also initiate radical responses. A sense of inclusivity in a common experience of injustice can drive support for social change (e.g., Drury & Reicher, 1999). Being socially included in a group with which an individual does not associate can instigate aversive reactions (Greenaway, Jetten, Ellemers, & van Bunderen, 2014).
If social inclusion and exclusion have the potential to evoke radical responses, what determines which prevails? One explanation is that people engage in behaviors that reject or justify the political system depending on their ideological beliefs (Feldstein, 2009). For example, conservative ideologies have been associated with the acceptance of inequalities (Jost, Glaser, Sulloway, & Kruglanski, 2003); liberal ideologies with the rejection of inequalities (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Another explanation is that acceptance or rejection is affected by national identification and whether people align with the radical group (Swann, Gómez, Seyle, Morales, & Huici, 2009). This approach argues that the greater the alignment of the self with the group, the more probable the person will exhibit pro-extreme behaviors in response to social exclusion (Gómez, Morales, Hart, Vazquez, & Swann, 2011). We assessed how social inclusion/exclusion affect these approaches to drive radical support in relation to different political issues.
At the start of radicalization, an individual shows interest in radical materials before getting involved with a radical group or engaging in radical actions (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). We investigated these behaviors in five experiments that recruited 516 British nationals and 95 American nationals. In the context of a hate speech incident, participants included in a group opposing hate speech showed a preference for radical material when exposed to a radical message that rejected the status quo. Although this radical message was perceived as more self-relevant than other forms, such as a terrorist advocacy message, it failed to initiate interest in radical material when no context was defined.
A further three studies focused on people’s behaviors of either joining or disseminating radical campaigns online. For Brexit, endorsing far-right campaigns depended on the perceived identity of the source of the radical message. Those who strongly identified with their British identity were more likely to endorse a far-right campaign if they had experienced social exclusion and exposure to a radical message by British delegates. A similar tendency was found for those who did not identify strongly with their British identity, but who were socially included by their national group, when the same message was expressed by European delegates. For climate change, political campaigns in favor of radical proposals were more likely to be endorsed by US participants under social inclusion when they aligned with the source of a pro-climate change radical message and reported activist intentions.
Yet, exposure to others’ exclusionary experiences did not directly elicit radical endorsements. In the context of the European elections, exposure to information about another being denied a vote did not predict support for a radical campaign against vote denial. Instead, it was the perceived democracy inefficiency predicted by common experiences of vote denial between UK and European citizens that initiated radical support. The findings suggest that whether social inclusion/exclusion leads to radical support depends on the identity and ideological factors prevalent in a political context. For Brexit, it was differences in the strength of national identity and people’s political orientation that determined endorsement of the far-right campaign. For hate speech, electoral mistreatments and climate change, it was the alignment with the source of the radical message that triggered radical support as a request for change against social inequalities.
The findings show that both social exclusion and inclusion can be drivers of radicalization subject to political demands. They both intersect and exacerbate existing drivers we all hold, such as our social identities and ideological positions, to direct public support for online radical campaigns. Notably, the political issues examined here can coexist in our society. People might feel socially included in some of these settings and excluded in others, which instigate different behaviors. The pandemic added to the severity of these experiences. Our research suggests that to understand how COVID-19 may affect radicalization, we need to interrogate the contextual dependency of these experiences. By treating social inclusion/exclusion as the outcome of social interaction, we can intervene to forestall the ways they may enhance political violence and advance the drivers of common good.
About the Authors
Anastasia Kordoni is a PhD Researcher at Lancaster University, UK, under the supervision of Prof. Paul J Taylor and Dr Stacey M Conchie. Her research examines how societal factors affect individual and collective radical responses. Anastasia is interested in the role of social identity and group processes in radicalization and in tactics for peaceful resolutions.
About the ISPP & its Blog
The International Society of Political Psychology is an interdisciplinary organization representing all fields of inquiry concerned with exploring the relationships between political and psychological processes. If you are interested in contributing an article or have any questions about the blog, please email them or visit the ISPP Blog’s webpage.
References
Bäck, E. A., Bäck, H., Altermark, N., & Knapton, H. (2018). The quest for significance: Attitude adaption to a radical group following social exclusion. International Journal of Developmental Science, 12(1–2), 25–36. doi: 10.3233/DEV-170230
Bal, M., & Van den Bos, K. (2017). From system acceptance to embracing alternative systems and system rejection: Tipping points in processes of radicalization. Translational Issues in Psychological Science, 3(3), 241–253. doi: 10.1037/tps0000123
Drury, J., & Reicher, S. (1999). The intergroup dynamics of collective empowerment: Substantiating the social identity model of crowd behavior. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 2(4), 381–402. doi: 10.1177/1368430299024005
Feldstein, S. P. (2009). Terrorist Ideology and the Implications of Radicalization. Hauppauge: Nova Science.
Gill, P., Horgan, J., & Deckert, P. (2014). Bombing alone: Tracing the motivations and antecedent behaviors of lone‐actor terrorists. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 59(2), 425–435. doi: 10.1111/1556–4029.12312
Gómez, Á., Morales, J. F., Hart, S., Vázquez, A., & Swann Jr, W. B. (2011). Rejected and excluded forevermore, but even more devoted: Irrevocable ostracism intensifies loyalty to the group among identity-fused persons. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37(12), 1574–1586. doi: 10.1177/0146167211424580
Greenaway, K. H., Jetten, J., Ellemers, N., & van Bunderen, L. (2015). The dark side of inclusion: Undesired acceptance increases aggression. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 18(2), 173–189. doi: 10.1177/1368430214536063
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129(3), 339–375. doi: 10.1037/0033–2909.129.3.339
McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2008). Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 20(3), 415–433. doi: 10.1080/09546550802073367
Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance orientation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(4), 741–763. doi: 10.1037/0022–3514.67.4.741
Swann Jr, W. B., Gómez, A., Seyle, D. C., Morales, J., & Huici, C. (2009). Identity fusion: The interplay of personal and social identities in extreme group behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96(5), 995–1011. doi:10.1037/a0013668
